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Approved For Release 2004/03/25 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001600150014-7

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Attachment  
USIB-D-28.5/12  
15 December 1975

### PROCEDURES FOR ALERT MEMORANDA

1. The Alert Memorandum (AM) is an interagency publication issued by the DCI on behalf of the Community. It provides explicit warning from the Director himself of possible developments abroad of major concern to the U.S. The AM is signed by the DCI, addressed to the members of WSAG, and disseminated, inter alia, to all USIB Principals and, via electrical transmission, appropriate embassies and field elements.
2. An AM may be initiated by the DCI or may be proposed by a USIB Principal, by a National Intelligence Officer (NIO), or by (or through) any other senior officer of the intelligence or foreign affairs communities. A proposal for an AM will be addressed to the DCI or the appropriate NIO. But, the decision to issue an AM will in all instances rest with the DCI.
3. Responsibility for the production of an AM will normally rest with the appropriate NIO, and he may call on any element of the Intelligence Community for support. Whenever possible, the NIO will coordinate a draft of the AM with appropriate USIB agencies, and dissenting views, if any, will be described in the Memorandum. The DCI, however, may authorize the NIO to limit or forego coordination when time is of the essence. All AMs will note the extent of coordination within the Community.
4. At the earliest possible time, the NIO should notify appropriate USIB agencies of the decision to produce an Alert Memorandum. \* When time permits, he should also indicate the source of information that led to the decision, the extent of coordination being sought, the amount of assistance (if any) desired, and the likely time of issuance. When feasible, appropriate U.S. embassies and field elements should also be notified that an Alert Memorandum is being prepared and their views should be solicited.

\*When feasible, NOIWON or other conferencing procedures may be used to so notify.

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An AM will in most circumstances be a discrete paper which provides the basic rationale for the issuance of a warning. Occasionally, however, an AM may consist simply of a covering memorandum attached to an existing intelligence document, suggesting in essence that the policymaker should focus on the situation reported in the basic document.

5. An AM will also clearly indicate what special actions are being taken by the Community to ensure effective coverage of the situation, e.g., the initiation of special collection efforts, the establishment of crisis task forces, etc.

6. A supplementary AM on a crisis should be produced whenever, in the view of the DCI, the crisis has greatly intensified or changed in some especially significant way. The NIO should issue an appropriate advisory to the recipients of an AM whenever, in his judgment, events indicate that the crisis at hand has abated or terminated (unless that fact is apparent to all). Collection efforts arising from the issuance of the alert should also be modified or cancelled as appropriate.

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USIB-D-71.11/19  
23 January 1976

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Procedures for Strategic Warning  
Notices

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-71.11/18, 16 January 1976  
b. USIB-M-714, 23 January 1976, Item 2

The attached Procedures for Strategic Warning Notices,  
which were approved by the United States Intelligence Board on  
23 January 1976, are circulated herewith for information and  
implementation.

Executive Secretary

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USIB-D-71.11/19

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PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC WARNING NOTICES

1. The Strategic Warning Notice (SWN) is a special report prepared by the Special Assistant for Strategic Warning (SA) and issued by the DCI when, in his judgment, there appears to be evidence that the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the People's Republic of China or North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond its borders or is employing its military capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten confrontation with the US.

2. The DCI will notify the President and the National Security Council of the warning notice and take such other action as he deems necessary. The DCI will also transmit the Strategic Warning Notices to the USIB Principals for further dissemination within their departments and agencies. (When appropriate, the DCI will also propose release of the substance of the warning notices to allied governments.) When time is of the essence, the SA may issue such notices directly to the President and NSC with concurrent dissemination to the DCI and USIB Principals.

3. An SWN will normally be initiated by the SA or, in his absence, the Director of the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS). It may also be proposed to the SA by a USIB Principal,

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a National Intelligence Officer, or by any other senior officer of the intelligence or foreign affairs communities. A proposal for an SWN will be addressed to the SA but the decision to issue an SWN will, when time permits, rest with the DCI.

4. Responsibility for preparing an SWN will rest with the SA, and he may call on any element of the Intelligence Community for support. Whenever possible the SWS will coordinate a draft of the SWN with the USIB participants and the appropriate National Intelligence Officer (NIO). Any dissenting views will be described in the SWN. The SA is authorized to limit or forgo coordination when time is of the essence. All SWNs will note the extent of coordination within the Community.

5. At the earliest possible time, the SWS should notify appropriate USIB participants of the decision to draft a Strategic Warning Notice.\* When time permits, the SWS should also indicate the source of information that led to the decision, the extent of coordination being sought, the amount of assistance desired, and the likely time of issuance. When feasible, appropriate US embassies and field commands should also be notified that an SWN is being prepared

\*When feasible, NOIWON or other conferencing procedures may be used to so notify.

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and their views should be solicited. An SWN will in most circumstances be a paper which provides the basic rationale for the issuance of a warning. Occasionally, however, an SWN may consist simply of a covering memorandum attached to an existing intelligence document, suggesting in essence that the policy maker should focus on the situation reported in the basic document.

6. An SWN will also clearly indicate what special actions are being taken to ensure effective coverage of the situation, e.g., the initiation of special collection efforts.

7. A supplementary SWN should be prepared whenever, in the view of the SA, the situation has greatly intensified or changed in some especially significant way. An appropriate advisory should be issued by the DCI whenever, in his judgment, events indicate that the crisis at hand has abated or terminated. Collection efforts arising from the issuance of the SWN should also be modified or canceled as appropriate.

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Attachment  
NFJB-D- 28.7/1  
30 June 1976

PROCEDURES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF A NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

PURPOSE

1. These procedures are designed to ensure that the need of high-level national consumers for frequent and timely intelligence during crises will be met by a National Intelligence Situation Report (Sitrep).

SITREP ACTIVATION

2. When international events, crises, or the needs of the NSC or its staff so demand, the DCI will direct that an interagency Task Force be formed for the purpose of producing an all-source Community-coordinated National Sitrep.

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION & STAFFING

3. CIA, DIA, State/INR, and NSA will form a Task Force to provide the 24-hour substantive support required to produce the National Sitrep. The DCI will designate one of these agencies to serve as his executive agent and to assume primary responsibility for producing the National Sitrep. The CIA will usually serve as executive agent but other agencies may be assigned this responsibility depending on the nature of the crisis. The executive agent will provide the facilities and other administrative support necessary for the publication and dissemination of the National Sitrep.

4. The executive agent will ask the participating agencies in the task force to assign analysts (when it is feasible for them to do so) to each of three daily task force shifts.

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(scheduling on a nine-hour basis will allow one-hour overlaps between shifts). These analysts will be invited to contribute to the drafting of the Sitrep and will serve as intermediaries between the task force and their parent agencies. In this latter capacity, they should:

- o Facilitate the flow of information from the field.
- o Clear documents for use in the National Sitrep.
- o Obtain clarification of information and answers to questions of a departmental nature.
- o Relay information requirements to their parent agencies; and
- o Assist in coordinating substantive judgments.

5. The Chief of the Task Force will be appointed by the executive agent. Unless other arrangements are specified by the DCI, the appropriate National Intelligence Officer will serve as the main link between the DCI, the Task Force, and the NSC Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) and NSC Staff.

#### CONTENT

6. The National Sitrep will seek to provide its readership with all intelligence and operational information bearing on the problem at hand, including sensitive intelligence information and information concerning US diplomatic initiatives and military activities.\*

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\*Inclusion of certain categories of especially sensitive information might at times severely limit distribution of the Sitrep; in those instances, the Task Force should consider the issuance of more than one edition, i.e., one given normal dissemination, the other given only to a few named principals.

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7. In addition to reporting and explaining the latest developments, the National Sitrep will, as appropriate:

- Analyze the significance and implications of developments for the immediate future.
- Provide in special annexes analyses and estimates of greater scope or depth.
- Summarize pertinent intelligence management actions, such as collection initiatives, undertaken as a result of the crisis.

8. The Sitrep will be coordinated among producing agencies to the extent permitted by time. Publication will not be delayed in order to secure extensive coordination. Items which have not been coordinated will bear a notification to that effect.

9. Coordination will be accomplished via CONTEXT (when all terminals become operational), LDX, secure phone, or any other available means. Producing agencies will ensure that all Sitrep information distributed by LDX receives the highest possible handling and forwarding precedence.

10. Important substantive disagreement will be clearly expressed in the National Sitrep and the dissenting organizations identified.

#### FREQUENCY

11. The Sitrep will be published as often as the particular circumstances of the crisis and the needs of the consumer require.

#### FORMAT

12. The National Sitrep will be prepared in a standard format--  
with cover and editorial approach (see attachment)--but the precise organization of each issue will be determined by the Task Force.

DISTRIBUTION

13. The National Sitrep will be designed for and sent to the President. It will also be disseminated to members of the National Security Council, other senior officials of the Government designated by the DCI, NSC Staff members, and senior members of the Intelligence Community. Situation reports prepared by individual organizations within the Community for their own purposes will not be disseminated to the White House except on specific request from those consumers. (This does not, of course, preclude dissemination to the White House Situation Room.)

TERMINATION AND CRITIQUE

14. The DCI will determine when production of the Sitrep should cease. Following the crisis, the Intelligence Community Staff will, when so requested by the DCI, conduct a review of Task Force activities, solicit the views of consumers concerning the adequacy of intelligence support provided, and recommend improvements in procedures.

ATTACHMENT:

Sample Format

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(CLASSIFICATION)

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S A M P L E

NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE  
SITUATION REPORT

Prepared by (e.g., CIA) as Executive Agent for  
the Director of Central Intelligence with the  
participation of DIA, NSA and State/INR.

AREA Middle East:  
NUMBER 6-76  
PERIOD 0600-1800 hours  
DATE 9 October 1976

Copy \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_

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Note: As a general rule, and as time permits, the presentation of information should be organized along the lines suggested below. But the Task Force will determine the sequence of these sections and whether or not events warrant such discrete coverage.

### SUMMARY & PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Reports, synthesizes, and explains the major late-breaking developments in the crisis (from Sections I, II, III, below) and highlights material from Section IV and the Annexes.

#### I. MILITARY SITUATION

(Major actions, movements, operations, and strategic considerations involving US and other forces.)

#### II. POLITICAL SITUATION

(Major political and foreign policy considerations involving US and other governments.)

#### III. ECONOMIC SITUATION

(Major economics, trade, and energy considerations involving US and other governments, or international groups.)

#### IV. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

(Major activities by the United Nations, or other international organizations, and Third World countries, likely to affect the course of the crisis in particular or US strategic and foreign policy interests in general.

#### Annexes (illustrative)

1. Special Topical Report
2. In-depth Analysis, Estimate

#### Distribution (illustrative)

#### (Authentication)

1. White House (1-30)
2. State Dept (31-60)
3. Defense (DIA and NSA) (61-90)
4. CIA (91-120)
5. IC Staff (121-130)
6. USIB (NFIB) (131-140)
7. DCI Personnel (141-?)

Director, Sitrep Task Force